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CONSENT PROVISIONS IN ABORTION STATUTES
In Roe v. Wade1 and Doe v. Bolton2 the Supreme Court of the
United States declared the abortion laws of Texas and Georgia to be
unconstitutional infringements upon a woman's right of personal pri-
vacy. These decisions implied that during the first trimester of a wom-
an's pregnancy the woman and her physician are to reach the abortion
decision and effectuation without any state interference.3 Consequently,
Roe and Doe implicitly suggested that many other abortion laws in ef-
fect at that time were unconstitutional.
4
Roe and Doe, however, left unsettled at least one important ques-
tion: can a state impose, as a prerequisite for a lawful abortion, the
requirement that a woman obtain the consent of the father of her
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
3. At the time of the decisions, fourteen states had abortion laws like Georgia's law,
which was patterned after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)
(for a general discussion of the MODEL PENAL CODE, see note 5 infra): ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-303 to -310 (Supp. 1971); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950-55.5 (West Supp.
1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§40-2-50 to -53 (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§
1790-93 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. § 458.22 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1201 to
-1203 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 23-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN §
21-3407 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 137-39 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.220
,(1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-5-1 to 40A-5-3 (1973); N.C. Laws 1967, ch. 367, § 2 as
amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 435-405-.495 (1971); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-82 to -86 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62 to -62.3 (Supp. 1973). Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-3 (1972) permits abortion when the pregnancy endangers the life of the
mother or is the result of rape. Thirty states had strict abortion laws like the Texas law
that permitted abortion only if the mother's life was endangered: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-211 (1950); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN §§ 53-29 to -31(b) (Supp. 1973); Idaho Laws
1972, ch. 336, § 1 (repealed 1973); IND. ANN STAT. §§ 10-105 to -106 (1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 701.1 (1950); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.020 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. § 37:1285 (6) (1964);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 51 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1970); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.14 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.18 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 559.100 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-401 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-405
(1971); N.H. REV. ANN. § 585-13 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-25-01 to -02 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.16 (Page 1954); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 861 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4718-19 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 11-3-1 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-17-1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
39-301 to -302 (1955); TEXAS PENAL CODE art. 1191-96 (1961); UTAH REV. STAT. § 4226
(1898) (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-1 (1953)) (repealed 1973); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 101 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-8 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (1958);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-77 to -78 (1959).
4. Since the Roe and Doe decisions, federal and state courts have declared abortion
laws unconstitutional in the following cases: Coe v. Gerstein, No. 72-1842-Civ-JE (S.D.
Fla., Aug. 14, 1973); State v. Wahlrab, 509 P.2d 245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); People v.
Norton, 507 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1973); People v. Frey, 294 N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1973); State v.
Hultgren, 204 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1973); State v. Hodgson, 204 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1973);
State v. Strance, 506 P.2d 1211 (N.M. 1973); State v. Kruze, 295 N.E.2d 916 (Ohio 1973);
Jobe v. State, 509 P.2d 481 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Page, 303 A.2d 215
(Pa. 1973); State v. Munson, 206 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. 1973).
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unborn child?5 This question should be answered as state legislatures
5. The Court in Roe merely stated:
Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton post, p. 179, do we discuss the father's
rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No pater-
nal right has been asserted in either of the cases, and the Texas and the Georgia
statutes on their face take no cognizance of the father. We are aware that some
statutes recognize the father under certain circumstances. North Carolina, for ex-
ample, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971), requires written permission for the
abortion from the husband when the woman is a married minor, that is. when she
is less than 18 years of age, 41 N.C.A.G. 489 (1971) . We need not now decide
whether provisions of this kind are constitutional.
410 U.S. at 165 n.67. "Father's rights" is an ambiguous term. It may refer to such in-
terests as his wish that his child be raised and cared for as well as possible, his claim to
any earnings of the child or his desire to receive a child's love and affection. See Marcus,
Equal Protection: The Custody of the lUegitimate Child, 11 J. FAMILY L. 1 (1972). In
this note, however, the right discussed is a right in the Hohfeldian sense; it is the right
of the father to have the mother seek his consent before terminating the pregnancy. Thus,
the right arises from the relationship of the parents although it protects the interests
commonly thought to be "parental rights."
To understand why fathers' rights became an issue only recently, it is necessary to
examine the history of abortion laws in the United States. Laws proscribing abortion at
any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life
do not come to us either from ancient or common law. There seemed to be no consistent
attitude taken by the ancients with respect to abortion. For a discussion of ancient and
common law treatment of abortion, see L. LADER, ABORTION 75-77 (1966); Means, The
Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to
Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-
Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 336-375 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Means I]. Neither Ro-
man law nor Roman morality opposed abortion; the basic legal principle was that the
fetus was not a human being, but pars viscerum matris. L. LADER, supra, at 76. Abortion
per se was not punishable by criminal penalty or social stigma. For a short time, Septi-
mius Severus (193-211 A.D.) attempted to exile wives who had abortions. This penalty,
however, was rarely inflicted, probably only when the father-husband had refused his
consent. Id. The husband, whose rule over the family as pater familias was absolute, im-
posed whatever restrictions there were. He could order his wife to seek an abortion, and
he could punish his wife or divorce her if she terminated a pregnancy without his con-
sent. Id. at 77. At common law, termination of a pregnancy before the fetus quickened
was no crime and the issue of a husband's consent to such an act was apparently never
raised. 410 U.S. at 132. Some scholars claim that at common law even abortion of a
quickened fetus was no criminal offense. Means I, supra, at 336-52; see 410 U.S. at 135;
L. LADER, supra, at 78-79.
At the time of the Roe and Doe decisions, the laws governing abortion in more than
half the states were the work of nineteenth century legislators. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, almost every American jurisdiction had absolutely prohibited the com-
mission or even the attempted commission of an abortion unless continuation of the
pregnancy would endanger the mother's life. Means I, supra, at 353. Legislators claimed
that these laws were needed to inhibit promiscuous sexual relations, to protect the fetus
and to protect women from the danger of nineteenth century surgery. Abele v. Markle,
342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated as moot, 410 U.S. 951 (1973). Again Means
disputes the commonly held view and claims that the only demonstrable legislative pur-
pose behind these strict laws was to protect pregnant women "from the danger to their
lives imposed by childbirth at term." Means I, supra, at 353. See also Means, The Law
of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of
Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Means II].
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The interest of a man in having his potential child born was not an interest that the
states felt compelled to protect explicitly. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) was the prototype for abortion law reform in the late sixties. By 1970 thir-
teen states had adopted legislation patterned after it. Abortion in these states was law-
ful if a licensed physician believed that "there is substantial risk that continuance of the
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the
child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse." MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (2) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
In 1970 Hawaii became the first American jurisdiction ever to permit legal abortions
regardless of the woman's motives. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp. 1971). If a licensed
physician terminated the pregnancy in a state-licensed hospital before the fetus became
viable, the state did not inquire into the reason for terminating the pregnancy. Within
the year Alaska, New York and Washington adopted laws similar to that of Hawaii.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05.3 (McKinney Supp. 1972);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1972). By the end of 1972 only these four states
had repealed criminal sanctions for abortions when performed in early pregnancy by
licensed physicians satisfying certain procedural and health requirements. Intransigent
legislators forced abortion reformers in other states to seek relief in state and federal
courts. In several states the courts declared that the existing abortion statutes were un-
constitutionally vague or that they infringed upon either a woman's right of personal
privacy or a married couple's right of marital privacy. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp.
800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated as moot, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.
224 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); Babbitz v. McCann, 310
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis.), injunction denied, 312 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dis-
missed, 400 U.S. 1, injunction granted, 320 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated and
remanded, 402 U.S. 903 (1971); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970), modi-
fied and ay'd, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972);
Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hanrahan
v. Doe, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972); People v.
Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v.
Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972). The Supreme Court of Vermont had stricken the
abortion law of that state on other grounds. Beecham v. Leahy, 287 A.2d 836 (Vt. 1972).
In other states the reformers' attacks were unsuccessful and the courts upheld the con-
stitutionality of the abortion laws. Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971),
vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Crossen v. Attorney Gen., 344 F. Supp. 587
(E.D. Ky. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Doe v. Rampton, No. C-234-70
(D. Utah, Sept. 8, 1971), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950 (1973); Rodgers v. Dan-
forth, Civil No. 18360-2 (W.D. Mo., Sept. 10, 1970), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S.
949 (1973); Rosen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970);
Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265
(Ind. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); Spears v. State, 257 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1972);
State v. Munson, 201 N.W.2d 123 (S.D. 1972), vacated and remanded, 410 U.S. 950, rev'd
on rehearing, 206 N.W.2d 434 (S.D. 1973).
Finally, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court declared that the strict Texas abortion
statute violated a woman's right of personal privacy. Using the same rationale, the Court
struck the Georgia abortion statute that was patterned after the Model Penal Code. The
Court's model for abortion regulation came even closer to allowing "abortion-on-demand"
than the most liberal state laws had. Until important state interests give compelling jus-
tification for the state's intervention (at approximately the end of the first trimester of
pregnancy) the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently and primarily a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the doctor. 410 U.S. at 163. Thus,
in the early stages of pregnancy, the decision to abort and its effectuation must be left
to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. id.
The evolution of statutory regulation of abortion in England parallels its evolution
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begin to draft new abortion laws that are within the Court's guide-
lines.6 In considering this question, legislatures must decide whether
there is a legal basis to compel or even to justify the existence of the
potential father's interests in the fetus.
In a few states new abortion laws adopted since Roe and Doe re-
quire the consent of the potential father for a lawful abortion regard-
less of the couple's marital status. 7 In other states a woman must obtain
the potential father's consent to the abortion only if he is also her hus-
band.8 If the intent of the Court was that a state treat abortion in the
first trimester of pregnancy as a medical decision to be made solely by
the woman and her doctor, then these consent provisions are inconsis-
tent with that intent.
Abortion reform organizations in some states are already challeng-
in the United States. The first English criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's
Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (1803), made abortion of a quick fetus a capital offense and as-
signed lesser sanctions for abortion of a fetus before quickening. This law was replaced
by the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 59, which eliminated
the death penalty and the distinction between pre-quickening and post-quickening abor-
tion. This act, in effect until the 1967 reform, did not allow abortion even when con-
tinuation of the pregnancy endangered the life of the mother. In 1938 Justice Macnaghten
construed the 1861 Act to permit abortion if a doctor reasonably believed that "the prob-
able consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a
physical or mental wreck." Rex v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687, 693-94 (1938). Finally, in
1967, Parliament passed the present law, Abortion Act 1967, c. 87:
Medical termination of pregnancy
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an
offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a
registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the
opinion, formed in good faith-
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the
pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such
risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this
section, account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably fore-
seeable environment. [Emphasis added.]
6. See note 5 supra.
7. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301 to -320 (Supp. 1973). See also notes 12-31
and accompanying text infra. See generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE REPEAL OF
ABORTION LAWS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REPORT (Aug. 19, 1973).
8. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.435
(1)(c) (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1972). In addition, VA. CODE
ANN. §§18.1-62.1 (e) (Supp. 1973) requires the husband's written consent if there is a
substantial medical likelihood that the child will be born with a permanent, incapacitat-
ing physical or mental defect. IDAHO CODE § 18-609 (Supp. 1973) requires the physician
and hospital to obtain this consent to avoid civil liability to the husband. See also notes
32-72 and accompanying text infra.
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ing the constitutionality of consent clauses.9 In states that lack consent
clauses, those favoring protection of a father's interests have also turned
to the courts to enforce these rights.10 While it is too early to predict
the ultimate fate of consent requirements, the trend seems to be against
enforcement."
I. THE POSITION OF THE PUTATIVE FATHER
When the issue of a father's right to participate in the abortion
decision is discussed, the putative father must be distinguished from
the husband-father. It is the latter who is more likely to have his in-
terests protected. The law has never viewed the father of an illegiti-
mate child in a very favorable light.12 At common law, during a period
when the law gave women few rights or responsibilities, the mother
of an illegitimate child was its legal guardian. 1 3 Today many states still
refuse to recognize any interest the putative father has in his child.14
For example, if the mother wishes to have the child adopted, the con-
sent of the putative father is often unnecessary.' 5 Even when the puta-
tive father has asserted a claim to his child in proceedings to terminate
the mother's parental rights, the court has looked on him with jaun-
diced eye.' 6
In Jones v. Smith, 7 the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
considered whether a potential putative father has the right to restrain
the natural mother from terminating the pregnancy that resulted from
their cohabitation. The court noted that this was a matter of first im-
pression in Florida, and, as best its research could determine, a matter
of first impression in the nation.'8
The appellant in this case was a divorced man who had dated the
9. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstein, No. 72-1842-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 1973); see NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TIlE REPEAL OF ABORTION LAWS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REPORT
(Aug. 19, 1973).
10. See notes 59 & 63 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 59, 63 & 73 and accompanying text infra.
12. In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 1965). See generally J. EEKELAAR,
FAMILY SECURITY AND FAMILY BREAKDOWN 191-215 (1971). This attitude toward putative
fathers may be changing. See Lippert, The Need for a Clarification of the Putative Fa-
ther's Legal Rights, 8 J. FAMILY L. 398 (1968).
13. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 176 (1968); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 431
(1964).
14. H. CLARK, supra note 13, at 176.
15. C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 491 (1966);
H. CLARK, supra note 13, at 176. But see In re Brennan, 134 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Minn. 1965).
16. 134 N.W.2d at 127; In re Guardianship of Smith, 265 P.2d 888, 892 (Cal. 1954)
(concurring opinion); id. at 893-94 (dissenting opinion).
17. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
18. Id. at 341.
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appellee, a nineteen-year-old unmarried woman, for approximately six
months. Appellant had expressed a desire to marry the appellee and to
assume all obligations, financial and other, for the care and support of
the unborn child. The woman, in her first trimester of pregnancy, did
not want to marry the appellant and wished to terminate the preg-
nancy. The appellant sought injunctive relief to restrain the appellee
from obtaining an abortion. When the Circuit Court of Orange County
denied relief, he appealed.19
When this case was litigated, Florida had a consent requirement
in its abortion law,20 but the requirement affected only married women
and minors. The court dismissed the father's contention that a distinc-
tion between "husband" (as used in the statute) and "putative father"
was invalid, 21 and said that the Florida statute gave the appellant no
basis to claim that his consent was necessary.2 2 Thus the court saw in
the wording of the statute no violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
The appellant offered three other grounds to support his right to
participate in the abortion decision. First, he contended that the
mother waived her right of privacy when she consented to and partici-
pated in sexual intercourse. 23 The court rejected this theory and found
that the mother's right of privacy with respect to termination of preg-
nancy is a "right separate and apart from any act of conception." 24 The
court concluded that whatever purported waiver might have occurred
because of conception, the interest of the natural father must remain
subservient to the well-being of the woman.2 5 Appellant's second con-
tention was that appellee's decision to terminate the pregnancy showed
her to be an unfit mother and constituted abandonment of the unborn
child.2 6 The court refused to conclude that a mother's decision to ob-
tain an abortion raised the issues of unfitness or abandonment.27 Fi-
nally, the appellant contended that the appellee had a contractual duty
to obtain his consent before she terminated her pregnancy. This duty
supposedly arose from an implied contract between the appellant and
the appellee. As evidence of the contract appellant offered: (1) his
agreement to support a child if appellee became pregnant; and (2)
19. Id. at 339
20. FLA. STAT. § 458.22 (3) (Supp. 1972); see note 67 and accompanying text infra.
21. 278 So. 2d at 342 n.3.
22. Id. at 342.
23. Id. at 342-43.
24. id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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appellee's conduct in (a) engaging in sexual intercourse without con-
traceptive devices, and (b) promising to marry the appellant."8 The
court said that because appellant could be obligated by law to support
the child, there was no consideration for such a contract.29, Even if the
appellant had only a moral obligation, without force of law, to under-
take the child's support, this could not serve as a basis to establish a
contract of "such legal and enforceable significance as to prevent a
termination of pregnancy otherwise permissible. ' ' 30 Finding all the
appellant's contentions to be without merit, the court denied him in-
junctive relief.
Although the appellant in Jones presented a nearly exhaustive list
of possible grounds to justify requiring the putative father's consent
for an abortion, there is another possible justification. In at least one
state, the court may require a putative father to pay for a therapeutic
abortion. 3' If this obligation were extended to cover expenses incurred
for an abortion "on request," failure to ensure the man's participation
in the abortion decision could violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 32 A state could avoid this problem if it ab-
sorbed the expense of abortions given to women too poor to pay the
costs themselves.
II. THE POSITION OF THE HUSBAND-FATHER
At common law the husband was the head of the family. 3 This
position entitled him to the services and earnings of his unemancipated
child as long as the child was legally in his custody.34 This right gave
him several causes of action if he was deprived of the child's services.3 5
His interest in the conception of children was recognized to the extent
that its denial by his spouse could be ground for annulling the mar-
riage.-3 His interest in the child during the period of gestation, how-
28. Id.
29. Id. at 344.
30. Id.
31. See C v. L, 305 N.Y.S.2d 69 (Family Ct. 1969); Note, Putative Father's Liability for
Expense of Abortion, 9 J. FAMILY LAW 433 (1969).
32. See Note, supra note 31.
33. See H. CLARK, supra note 13, at 261-62.
34. Id. at 584.
35. Id. at 269-70, 278; Lippert, supra note 12, at 402.
36. One author has concluded: "[S]ince sexual intercourse and the procreation of chil-
dren are fundamental to marriage, misrepresentation of intent with respect to these
matters is essential fraud for which annulment may be granted." H. CLARK, supra note
13, at 111. The marriage, however, will not be annulled unless (1) there was a premarital
fraudulent intent not to have children, (2) the other party to the marriage would have
refused to enter the marriage if aware of that intent, and (3) the defrauded party ceases
cohabitation immediately after learning of this intent. Primmer v. Primmer, 234 N.Y.S.2d
1973]
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ever, was apparently unprotected."
Few husbands have sought recovery of damages from an abortionist
after abortions performed without their consent.38 In only three suits
has the husband claimed the loss of his potential offspring as a basis
for the action.3 9 In Kausz v. Ryan,40 Mrs. Kausz had returned to her
mother's home and then terminated her pregnancy. Mr. Kausz charged
that the defendant, Dr. Scharf, had caused the miscarriage and deprived
him of his offspring.41 The trial court had sustained a demurrer to this
claim, and the appellate court upheld this ruling.4 2 The appellate court
held that Kausz could not recover for injury to his offspring "in [sic]
ventre sa mere,"43 except for the loss of the child's services caused by
the abortion;4 4 the father had not sought such damages. In dictum, the
court suggested that the law would not allow such a claim for damages
because it would be based upon very remote and speculative conse-
quences of the abortion.4 1
795, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Bentz v. Bentz, 67 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1947). Even if annul-
ment is impossible, refusal to procreate may be grounds for divorce or a decree of sepa-
ration. See Kreyling v. Kreyling, 23 A.2d 800 (N.J. ch. 1942); Longtin v. Longtin, 22
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940). Contra, Fink v. Fink, 105 A.2d 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1954)
(distinguished on its facts from Kreyling); Matovcik v. Matovcik, 98 A.2d 238 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1953).
The court in Fowler v. Fowler, [1952] T.L.R. 143, offered the following justification for
distinguishing between the refusal by a husband to procreate and a similar refusal by
a wife:
If a man takes contraceptive measures against the will of his wife so as to prevent
her having any children, without reasonable excuse for doing so, then it is easy to
infer that he does it with intent to inflict misery on her .... But when the wife
herself takes contraceptive measures . . . her conduct can often be attributed to
fear of the consequences to herself without any intention of injuring him. She fears
the pain and risk of childbirth. This is very unnatural and unfortunate, but it is
not cruelty unless she also has an intention to inflict misery on the husband.
Id. at 147. By analogy, it is possible that obtaining an abortion without the husband's
consent might give him grounds for divorce on a theory of cruelty. Contra, Matovcik v.
Matovcik, supra at 241. In states with "no fault" divorce statutes, see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ch. 61 (1971), such behavior of the wife would certainly be evidence of the irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage.
37. Duin, New York's Abortion Reform Law: Unanswered Questions, 37 ALBANY L.
REV. 22, 47-48 (1972); Means II, supra note 5, at 428-29.
38. Touriel v. Benveniste, Civil Docket No. 766790 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20,
1961); Kausz v. Ryan, I N.W. 485 (Iowa 1879); Philippi v. Wolff, 14 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 196
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873); Herko v. Uviller, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
39. Touriel v. Benveniste, Civil Docket No. 766790 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20,
1961); Kausz v. Ryan, 1 N.W. 485 (Iowa 1879); Herko v. Uviller, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
40. 1 N.W. 485 (Iowa 1879).
41. Id. at 486.
42. Id. at 485.
43. Id. at 487.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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In Herko v. Uviller," the plaintiff husband brought an action
against his wife's uncle for deprivation of further offspring and for
loss of consortium. While still living with her husband, Mrs. Herko
had discovered that she was pregnant. She consulted her uncle, a physi-
cian, about terminating the pregnancy. At that time Herko told Uviller
that he opposed an abortion. After the pregnancy had been terminated,
Herko brought suit. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action. The court granted the motion on
the grounds that the consent of Herko's wife to the operation precluded
him from maintaining his action. 47
The holdings of the preceding cases suggest that if there is any legal
basis for recognizing a father's right to participate in the abortion de-
cision, this right is derived from the marital relationship rather than
the parent-child relationship. Further support for this theory comes
from a recent case in which a father sought compensation from the
abortionist for the loss of his unborn child. In Touriel v. Benveniste,4 8
the court recognized that the plaintiff husband had an interest in his
unborn child distinct from his wife's interests in the child and thus
was unaffected by her consent to an illegal abortion.49 The court found
that an illegal abortion interferes with separate interests of the husband
and wife in the rights, duties and privileges stemming from the marital
relationship. 50 Consequently, the defendant's intentional destruction
of the parental relation of the plaintiff to his child and the deprivation
of plaintiff's right to father a child was regarded as injuring an impor-
tant and genuine interest. 51
46. 114 N.Y.S.2d 618 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
47. The court stated:
The allegation in the instant complaint that plaintiff's wife consulted with de-
fendant for the purpose of aborting her pregnancy clearly implies that she partici-
pated in the commission of the act complained of and, therefore, she would be pre-
cluded from maintaining any cause of action arising out of the transaction. See
Larocque v. Conheim, 42 Misc. 613, 87 N.Y.S. 625.
Although "the invasion of the husband's interests in the marriage relation is a
separate tort against him, it is conditioned upon factors which also constitute a
tort against the wife. * * * Unless, therefore, the actor has become liable to the
wife, he cannot be subject to liability to the husband." Restatement, Torts, Section
693, Comment d, p. 493.
Id. at 619.
48. Civil Docket No. 766790 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1961).
49. For a discussion of this decision, see 14 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1962); 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 908, 909 (1962). The abortion had been performed ten years before plaintiff brought
this suit. Claiming that the statute of limitations was tolled, the defendant demurred to
the complaint. To allow itself to determine if the statute barred the present action, the
court sustained a demurrer requiring plaintiff to plead with more certainty. 14 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (1962).
50. 14 STAN. L. REV. 901, 903 (1962).
51. Id. at 907.
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It is possible that administrative difficulties in compensating a man
for such speculative damages account for the past reluctance of courts
and legislatures to protect the interests of a potential father.5 2 It is sig-
nificant, however, that legislatures did not give protection of the po-
tential father's interests as a reason for endorsing strict pre-Roe abor-
tion laws.55 Of the states with statutes patterned after the ALI Model
Abortion Act, 54 only four have required the husband's consent.5"
Among the four states adopting modified abortion-on-demand statutes
before Roe,56 only Washington required the husband's consent 7 All
these reform laws were passed after Touriel, and of the eighteen states
with such statutes, fourteen-including California, the state in which
the Touriel decision was rendered-rejected the reasoning of the Tou-
riel court.
Only recently has there been litigation challenging the constitution-
ality of abortion laws lacking consent provisions."8 In California there
have been three such challenges.5 9 In each case, a husband hoped to
prevent his wife from undergoing a legal abortion against his will;
without opinion, each court denied the relief sought.
The 1970 New York reform statute0 also lacks a consent require-
ment. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,61 in dictum,
stated that a consent provision was not necessary to ensure the law's
constitutionality. 2 Subsequently, in Doe v. Doe,63 a husband specifi-
52. Id.
53. The reasons cited by legislatures for adopting strict abortion laws were to pro-
hibit promiscuous sexual relations, to protect the fetus and to protect women from dan-
gerous surgical procedures. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972); va-
cated as moot, 410 U.S. 951 (1973); cf. Means I, supra note 5, at 376-83.
54. For a general discussion of the Model Penal Code abortion law and the state
laws patterned after it, see notes 3 & 5 supra.
55. CoLo. RE-.. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-50 (4) (a) (i) (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. § 458.22 (3)
(Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 435.435 (c) (1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-62.1 (e) (Supp.
1973).
56. See note 5 supra.
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1972).
58. See notes 59 & 61 infra.
59. O'Beirne v. Superior Ct., 1 Civ. 25174 (Cal. Sup. Ct., December 6, 1967); Kalos v.
Kalos, No. 604717 (San Francisco Super. Ct., June 30, 1969); Alvarado v. Alvarado, No.
223881 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., July 14, 1969). O'Beirne is discussed in Means II, supra
note 5, at 430. All three cases are cited in Brief for the National Association for the Re-
peal of Abortion Laws (NARAL) as Amicus Curiae at 12, Doe v. Doe. 72 C 386-72 (Nas-
sau County Sup. Ct., May 24, 1972).
60. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05.3 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
61. 329 N.Y.S.2d 722 (Sup. Ct.), motion to resettle order denied, 332 N.Y.S.2d 63
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 286 N.E.2d 887, motion of appellant to expedite consideration denied,
400 U.S. 821 (1972), application for temporary restraining order denied, 410 U.S. 904,
appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
62. 329 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
63. 72 C 386-72 (Nassau County Sup. Ct., May 24, 1972). The files of this case are
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cally challenged the absence of a consent provision in the New York
law. The couple involved had separated before the wife discovered
that she was pregnant. After the woman told her husband that she
would have an abortion, he obtained a restraining order to stop her
from terminating the pregnancy. Before Doe could serve the order,
his wife entered a hospital and had her abortion.6 4 Doe then obtained
a court order compelling his wife to show why she should not be held
in contempt of court for ignoring the injunction.2
In his complaint the husband presented a constitutional argument
to support his claim that he had a right to participate in the abortion
decision. Because of the Byrn decision,66 the husband conceded that a
fetus under twenty-four weeks of age was not a person for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment.' He contended, however, that if the fetus
was not a person, then it must be a thing. And, since all things are
objects of property rights, his wife's unilateral decision to abort the
fetus under color of the 1970 reform statute deprived the plaintiff of
property without due process of law.6 A major flaw in this reasoning
is that not all things are objects of property rights. 69 Recognizing the
fetus to be an object of property rights vested in the father would be
tantamount to imposing slavery "on the womb and the intrauterine
foetus of a free woman in violation of the thirteenth amendment. '' 70
The husband's alternative contention was that the matrimonial con-
tract give him the right to participate in the abortion decision. 71 The
court rejected both the constitutional and the contractual arguments
offered by the husband and held that the wife was not in contempt.
7 2
This means that in New York a husband has no legally recognized right
to participate in the abortion decision.
In Coe v. Gerstein,73 the plaintiffs brought a class action challenging
the constitutionality of the Florida statute regulating therapeutic abor-
tions.74 Among the prerequisites for a legal abortion in Florida was the
sealed by court order. The author's knowledge of this case is based on newspaper
accounts and the brief of an anicus curiae, and on discussions with Roxanne
Oliva, executive director of the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws
(NARAL) by telephone to New York City on Aug. 27, 1973, and with Elissa Krauss of the
New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) in New York City on Aug. 29, 1973.
64. N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 18, 1972, at 5, col. I (final ed.).
65. Id. at col. 5.
66. 329 N.Y.S.2d at 735-36.
67. Brief for NARAL, supra note 59, at 3.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5; cf. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
70. Brief for NARAL, supra note 59, at 6.
71. Id. at 7.
72. 72 C 386-72 (Nassau County Sup. Ct., May 24, 1972).
73. No. 72-1842-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 1973).
74. FLA. STAT. § 458.22 (Supp. 1972).
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consent of the husband, if he had not abandoned his wife.75 One of the
five plaintiffs in Coe was a married woman in her first trimester of
pregnancy. She had been unable to obtain her husband's consent for
a therapeutic abortion, which her doctor had certified to be necessary
to preserve her health. Plaintiffs challenged the statute as an imper-
missible interference by the state with "a woman's right of privacy as
that right encompasses the decision to terminate a pregnancy.' '7 6
The court acknowledged that a husband's interest in the fetus was
qualitatively different from the interest of his wife.7 7 The court also
recognized that the father's interest in seeing his procreation carried
full term "is, perhaps, at least equal to that of the mother. ' '7 8 The fa-
ther's interest, however, might reasonably be related either to protec-
tion of maternal health or to protection of the life of his potential off-
spring.7 9 The court nevertheless held the statute unconstitutional be-
cause neither of these concerns had been held to justify state interven-
tion in Roe v. Wade. The state could not delegate to husbands a right
that the state itself did not possess. s0 If the state had been able to show
that the consent provision was designed to protect third party inter-
ests attaching at the moment of conception and distinct from concern
for either the mother's health or the potential child's life, then the
court would not have felt bound by the Roe v. Wade decision.8 '
While the court endorsed participation by a husband in the abor-
tion decision, it stressed that a man could not expect the state to grant
him the power to regulate in an area in which the state itself lacked
such power.8 2 The court did not believe that new legislation could be
drafted to cure the flaw in the Florida statute.8 3
Proponents of the right to fatherhood contend that it is a funda-
mental principle of democratic society that one who will be affected
by the decisions of others should participate in the making of these
decisions.8 4 Consequently, because it is "within his human rights to
father a child,' ' 5 a husband should not be deprived of a voice in his
wife's decision to seek an abortion. 8 They claim that if the law is to
75. FLA. STAT. § 458.22(3) (Supp. 1972).
76. No. 72-1842-Civ-JE, at 2 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 1973).
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 6-7.
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at n.6.
84. D. CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, ClOICE, AND MORALITY 466 (1972).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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continue to support family solidarity, it is questionable whether a wife
should be able to dispose legally of any unborn child of her marriage
without the knowledge, advice and consent of the father, her husband. 7
But one who will be affected by the decision of others cannot always
participate in the making of those decisions. For example, the unilat-
eral decision of one spouse to end a marriage can serve in some states
as grounds for divorce. 8
In New York, the fetus, if born after its father dies, can share in
the father's intestate estate.89 It is feared that an abortion law that con-
tains no consent requirement gives the wife the right to inherit the
husband's entire estate by preventing offspring.90 Thus she could de-
prive her husband of the opportunity to transfer his "name and prop-
erties to 'flesh of his flesh': another inalienable right."'91
A. Right To Procreate
The law should protect a man's right to procreate only if it is in
the public interest to do so. Because the basic structure of society is the
family, the state has a compelling interest to ensure that each family
unit has maximum stability; the institution of marriage is the principal
tool used by the state to control family formation and dissolution.92
Recognition of a right to natural fatherhood outside the institution of
marriage would eliminate a major incentive for a man to wed before
he begins a family.
B. Marriage Contract Theory
The marriage contract theory espoused in support of consent provi-
sions may not comport with public policy. It is extremely doubtful that
87. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, in ABORTION AND THE LAW
113 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
88. See, e.g., FIA. STAT. § 61.052 (1971).
89. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967). It is also possible that
an afterborn child would share if his father died testate under N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.2 (McKinney 1967).
90. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 894, 335 N.Y.S.2d
390, 400 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
91. Id.
92. For example, one court has concluded:
[M]arriage is a civil or social institution, publici juris, being the foundation of
the family, and the origin of domestic relations of the utmost importance to civili-
zation and social progress; hence the state is deeply concerned in its maintenance
in purity and integrity.
In re Moorehead's Estate, 137 A. 802, 806 (Pa. 1927); accord, Primmer v. Primmer, 234
N.Y.S.2d 795, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962); J. EEKELAAR, FAMILY SECURITY AND FAMILY BREAKDOWN
15 (1971). "Marriage is a great institution. No family should be without it." THE WIT AND
WISDOM OF MAE WEST 85 (J. Weintraub ed. 1967).
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enforcing such a contract right could contribute to family stability and
happiness. A psychiatrist, H. Rosen, has described three situations in
which the husband refused to consent to the performance of a thera-
peutic abortion upon his wife.9 3 In the first case it was necessary to
have the woman involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital until
the child's birth. Two days after she returned to her family, the woman
killed her four children and herself.9 4 In the second case, one hospital
had discharged the wife because her husband refused to give written
consent for the abortion. She entered another hospital in the same city,
claimed to be unmarried, and obtained her therapeutic abortion.9 5 The
woman in the last case carried her child to term and started divorce
proceedings immediately after the birth."'
A study of Swedish children born after their mothers had been re-
fused abortions revealed that in comparison with the control group,
the unwanted children were more often arrested for antisocial or crimi-
nal behavior and required more psychiatric care. 7 The girls in this
group married early and had children early, possibly perpetuating a
vicious cycle. 8 In an unrelated study,99 another psychiatrist, G. Caplan,
reported that while he was treating several emotionally disturbed chil-
dren in Israel, he learned that their mothers had felt a strong desire to
abort the particular child in treatment, and some of these mothers had
made many attempts to do so.'00 The relationship of the mothers with
the siblings of Caplan's patients ranged from adequate to good, but
each woman was inexplicably damaging and cruel to the unwanted
child.'0 ' There are also data that suggest links between unwantedness
and both child abuse10 2 and development of schizophrenia in chil-
dren.1 0 3
93. Francis, Law, Morality, and Abortion, 22 RUTcERS L. REV. 415, 440 (1968); Rosen,
Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy, 17 WESTERN RE-
SERVE L. REV. 435 (1965).
94. Francis, supra note 93, at 440; Rosen, supra note 93, at 458.
95. Francis, supra note 93, at 440; Rosen, supra note 93, at 458.
96. Rosen, supra note 93, at 458.
97. For a discussion and analysis of this study, see R. GARDNER, ABORTION: TiHE PER-
SONAL DILEmMA 227 (1972); Beck, Abortion: The Mental Health Consequences of Un-
wantedness (Association for the Study of Abortion, Inc. Reprint 5), reprinted from 2
SEMINA S IN PSYCHIATRY No. 3 (1970); Hardin, Abortion-or Compulsory Pregnancy? (As-
sociation for the Study of Abortion, Inc. Reprint 3), reprinted from 30 JOURNAL OF MAR-
RIAGE AND THE FAMILY No. 2 (1968).
98. Beck, supra note 97, at 5; Hardin, supra note 97, at 3.
99. Caplan, The Disturbance of Mother-Child Relationship by Unsuccessful Attempts
at Abortion, 38 MENTAL HYGIENE 67 (1954).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 76.
102. D. ScHuLER & F. KENNEDY, ABORTION RAP 130-39 (1971).
103. For a discussion of this data, see Beck, supra note 97, at 6.
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Even if the marriage contract could provide the basis for asserting
the father's right to participate in the abortion decision, it is unlikely
that the courts would compel the wife to give specific performance of
this contractual duty. Because the Bill of Rights protects the right of
marital privacy10 4 and because the matrimonial contract is a personal
service contract, 1°0 courts are unlikely to grant injunctive relief.
C. The Woman's Interests
A man's interest in continuing his bloodline must be weighed
against his wife's interests. Courts recognizing that the father may have
a compelling interest in the birth of his offspring also admit that his
interests are not the same as those of his wife. 10 Recent legal recogni-
tion of the woman's separate interests in deciding whether to obtain
an abortion, together with recently passed equal rights statutes" and
the pending equal rights amendment,l °s suggest that the rights of
women in the American legal system are undergoing a profound
change. For a woman, the decision to carry and to bear a child places
extraordinary limitations upon her newly emerging rights. These limi-
tations include: (1) the curtailment (and often the end) of educational
and employment opportunities; (2) the profound physical changes
upon her body; and (3) the danger to her health. " If the woman is
already under stress from the burdens of household and job responsi-
bilities, an unwanted pregnancy is likely to cause the woman and her
family additional anxiety and mental distress." 0
There may also be constitutional grounds for denying legal protec-
tion to the father's interests. In Coe, the basis for the court's action was
a woman's right of personal privacy.", Another possible basis is that
compelling a woman to bear unwanted children "perpetuates the in-
ferior status that the Nineteenth Amendment was to eradicate.
' ' 1 2 If
a husband's religion forbids abortion and his wife is not opposed to
104. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
105. H. CLARK, supra note 13, at 261; Brief for NARAL, supra note 59, at 7.
106. Coe v. Gerstein, No. 72-1842-Civ-JE (S.D. Fla, Aug. 14, 1973); Touriel v. Ben-
veniste, Civil Docket No. 766790 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., Oct. 20, 1961); see 14 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (1962); 110 U. PA. L. REv. 908 (1962).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
108. S. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
109. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated as moot, 410
U.S. 951 (1973).
110. R. GARDNER, supra note 97, at 158-59; Sloane, The Unwanted Pregnancy (Asso-
ciation for the Study of Abortion, Inc. Reprint 1), reprinted from 280 NEw ENcLAND J.
OF MEDICINE 1206 (1969).
111. No. 72-1842-Civ-JE, at 6 (S.D. Fla., Aug. 14, 1973).
112. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F, Supp. 1048, 1056 (D.N.J. 1972).
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abortion, a statute requiring the husband's consent may unduly in-
fringe upon the woman's first amendment rights by forcing her to obey
the tenets of her husband's religion.
113
D. Practical Considerations
From a more practical point of view, would a man really want to
live for seven or eight months with a woman whom he has compelled
to remain pregnant against her will? As a matter of public policy,
should a state adopt laws that give husbands (and even putative fa-
thers) the power to compel their partners to be pregnant? If a couple
disagrees on the fundamental issue of whether to carry the child to
term, this suggests that there may already be something drastically
wrong with the relationship. 114 It is difficult to believe that a woman,
knowing her husband to be unalterably opposed, would seek an abor-
tion unless she believed that the pregnancy posed an even greater threat
to their relationship. In a happy, stable marriage the decision to termi-
nate a pregnancy is and should be shared by the husband and wife.
Psychiatrists, however, seem to feel that if the wishes of the husband
and wife conflict, the wife's wishes should prevail. 11 Otherwise "un-
wanted and unplanned pregnancies, [with] their aftermath of unloved
and neglected children [will continue] to create substantial suffering
in this country."'116 Psychiatrists note that there appears to be no direct
relationship between a woman's physical capacity to conceive and her
mental capacity to satisfy the physical and psychological needs of an
infant."' Few men are in a position to remain at home and care for
their infant children;" 8 this burden usually falls upon the mother. If
she is unable or unwilling to care for her child, assumption of this ob-
ligation must fall elsewhere.
Public policy and the constitutional rights of women may dictate
that any requirement of a husband's consent be declared invalid. But
even if consent provisions are stricken as unconstitutional infringe-
ments upon the rights of women, legal reforms will not immediately
change firmly held attitudes and prejudices. Psychiatrists believe that
the usual reason a woman seeks abortion is that she does not want a
child.119 Many people refuse to accept this belief because it destroys
113. Duin, supra note 37, at 48.
114. D. CALLAHAN, supra note 84, at 440.
115. Rosen, supra note 93, at 464; Hardin, supra note 97, at 2. See generally Beck,
supra note 97, at 7-11.
116. Sloane, supra note 110, at 5.
117. Beck, supra note 97, at 11.
118. PARADE, Sept. 30, 1973, at 20.
119. Rossi, Abortion Laws and Their Victims, TRANS-ACTION, Sept.-Oct., 1966, at 7.
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the image of women as nurturing, loving creatures who welcome the
opportunity to produce a new member of the human race.120 But the
most ardent opposition to abortion controls has come from women.121
These women believe that the abortion decision is one to be made
by each woman without the concurrence of either other members of
her family or physicians because each woman has the right to limit her
own reproduction. 2 2
The abolition of all explicit consent requirements in state abortion
statutes may not eliminate the difficulties a woman must overcome to
obtain an abortion. 2 3 In New York, hospitals still require the written
consent of the husband if they learn that the woman seeking the abor-
tion is married. 12 4 Before the abortion will be scheduled, she must ob-
tain that consent although she may no longer live with her husband
120. id.
121. A Woman Views Abortion, Address by Marya Mannes, Second Annual Forum
of the Association for the Study of Abortion, Inc., Mar. 30, 1966; Cisler, Unfinished Busi-
ness: Birth Control and Women's Liberation, in SISTERHOOD Is POWERFUL 245 (R. Morgan
ed. 1970).
122. One commentator suggests:
Proposals for "reform" are based on the notion that abortion must be regulated,
meted out to deserving women under an elaborate set of rules designed to provide
"'safeguards against abuse." . .. [N]ew bills make it quite clear that a woman's own
decision is meaningless without the "right" reasons, the concurrence of her family,
and the approval of a bunch of strange medical men. Repeal is based on the quaint
idea of justice: that abortion is a woman's right and that no one can veto her de-
cision and compel her to bear a child against her will. All the excellent supporting
reasons-improved health, lower birth and death rates, freer medical practice,
the separation of church and state, happier families, sexual privacy, lower welfare
expenditures-are only embroidery on the basic fabric: woman's right to limit her
own reproduction.
Cisler, supra note 121, at 276.
123. Since 1967, England has had a moderate abortion law with no consent provision.
See note 5 supra. Mr. St. John-Stevas (Chelmsford, C.) had sought inclusion of the re-
quirement that the husband's written consent be given before his wife's pregnancy could
be legally terminated. Claiming that such a requirement could make an abortion im-
possible, Mr. Steel (Roxburgh, L.), sponsor of the 1967 Act in the House of Commons,
resisted the insertion. The Commons Standing Committee on the Medical Termination
of Pregnancy Bill rejected the consent provision by a sizeable majority. The Times (Lon-
don), Mar. 17, 1967, at 3, col. 5. Nonetheless, the medical societies urge each general
practitioner to obtain the consent of his patient's spouse before agreeing to terminate
the pregnancy. Dudley-Brown, The Duties of the General Practitioner Under the Abor-
tion Act, in THE ABORTION ACT 1967-PRoCEEDINGS OF A SYMPoSIUM HELD BY THE MEDICAL
PROTECTION SOCIETY IN COLLABRATION WITH THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTrInON-
ERs 3 (1969). This policy of encouraging the husband's participation in the abortion de-
cision has inhibited women seeking abortions in some parts of England. Lennox, Prob-
lems of the Abortion Act in General Practice, in THE ABORTION ACT 1967-PROCEEDINGS
OF A SYMPOsIuM HELD BY THE MEDICAL PROTECTION SOCIETY IN COLLABORATION WITH THE
ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS 18 (1969). See also, Simms, The Abortion Act
-One Year Later, 9 B.J. CRIM. 282 (1969).
124. Duin, supra note 37, at 47-48; Means II, supra note 5, at 433-34; Comment, The
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and although he may not be the father of the fetus. 12 5 The risk of mal-
practice suits filed by disgruntled husbands with the attendant harmful
publicity will probably make physicians unwilling to perform any
abortion without the husband's consent. The New York experience
suggests that doctors' attitudes will not be swayed by legislative repeal
of consent provisions or by judicial decisions that the loss of a child
through an abortion performed with the wife's consent does not give
rise to a valid cause of action.'
Despite any legislative or court action, it is unlikely that in most
marriages the decision to seek abortion will ever become a unilateral
one. Physicians likely will continue to require a husband's consent
before they will agree to perform an abortion upon a woman who they
know is married. But the woman determined to obtain an abortion
without her husband's consent will be able to do so, just as she can do
now, by denying that she is married. 127
K.B. LEVITZ
N.Y. Abortion Reform Law: Considerations, Application and Legal Consequences-More
Than We Bargained For?, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 644, 661 (1971).
125. Duin, supra note 37, at 47-48; Means II, supra note 5, at 433-34.
126. Means II, supra note 5, at 433-34.
127. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
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